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OF AUTONOMY AND SELF-RESPECf
Contemporary discussions of the morality of
lying often incorporate considerations of autonomy
and the principle of respect for autonomy.
Although the conceptio.ns of autonomy invoked are
diverse, the usual concern is with determining
which lies, if any, are compatible with respecting
the autonomy of the person to whom the lie is told.
When questions arise about the relevance of some
lack of autonomy to an evaluation of the morality of
a particular lie, what is at issue is the lied-to
person's autonomy of lack of autonomy.! In
contrast, many Greek comments about lying,
reflecting the Greek ethical emphasis on character
and virtue, focus on the person lying. Individuals
who resort to lies and deception are seen as unfree
and/or as lacking in self-respect.2 My purpose in
this paper is to elucidate the view, expressed in
various Greek comments, that telling lies is
ordinarily incompatible with one's own freedom
and self-respect. This will involve bringing out the
relevant Greek distinctions and relating them to
several conceptions of autonomy. A secondary
purpose is to briefly contrast some Greek concerns
regarding lying with some contemporary ones.
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I. Freedom vs. Unfreedom or Slavishness
The fundamental idea behind the Greek
condemnation of lies to be discussed in this paper
is that lies indicate a failure of control on the
agent's part over that which ought to be within the
control of an individual leading a life of human
excellence. It is reflected in aphoristic statements
such as the following: "To lie belongs to the
unfree, to speak the truth to the noble. "3 The
relevant dichotomy is between the character and
actions appropriate to the free or independent
individual and the character and actions of the
individual described as unfree or slavish.4 Unfree-
dom or slavishness is attributed to those who lie
out of need, fear, or acquisitiveness or out of a
desire for others' approval. It involves a lack of
sufficient control over one's internal states and/or
one's external situation. A failure of control may
be due to a lack (e.g., of financial resources) or to
the presence of some obstructive factor (e.g.,
excessive fear) or to a combination of the two. In
contrast, free individuals have their needs, fears,
and acquisitive desires, as well as their desire for
others' approval, under sufficient control so that
they eschew lies which are grounds for disgrace
and a forfeiture of self-respect. Lying to others in
order to please them by telling them what they want
to hear rather than the truth is especially seen as
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indicating that, at least to some extent, one's life
and actions are controlled by other individuals and
not by oneself. In contrast, being open and truthful
shows one's independent control over one's life
and actions.
To understand Greek conceptions of freedom
and unfreedom as these are embodied in the
contrast between free and slavish or unfree
individuals, it is useful to begin with some typical
Greek conceptions regarding slaves. 5 Slaves are
individuals whose lives are not their own but
belong to others. As Aristotle describes them,
slaves are living property -- instruments controlled
and used by their owners. Disempowered and
precluded from being self-determining, slaves are
not permitted to either choose their own goals or to
make the sorts of choices or voluntarily perform the
sorts of actions which are grounds for respect.
Furthermore, slaves are sometimes seen as
motivated solely by desires to avoid b<xlilypain or
attain bodily pleasures. Acting under orders,
slaves may lie as well as perform other acts that
those having self-respect would refuse to perform.
Insofar as slaves perform such acts either for the
sake of avoiding physical pain or for the sake of
some bodily pleasure within the owner's power to
bestow, slaves are seen as motivated in ways
appropriate to animals but not to those living
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worth-while human lives.6 Looked at from the
standpoint of those who are free under the law, to
be a slave is grounds for shame (although slaves
themselves are sometimes seen as incapable of
shame).? But one has analogous grounds for
shame if, being legally free, one performs some
wrongful act because one is ordered to do so by
one with superior power.8 The grounds for shame
do not lie simply in the wrongness of the act
performed but in the fact that in relation to the one
wielding power one is marked as unfree so that
one's condition is analogous to that of a slave. The
contrast between being in control and being
controlled remains fundamental when terms
denoting slavery, freedom, and their cognates are
used in marking contrasts other than a difference in
legal status. Also fundamental in the contrasts is
the idea that being free is a necessary condition for
being worthy of respect.
Various aspects of the Greek conception of
slaves are incorporated into the distinction between
free and slavish or unfree individuals. First, just as
slaves are thought to be motivated solely by a
desire to attain physical pleasure or avoid pain, so,
too, with unfree or slavish persons. Aristotle
compares slavish persons with grazing animals and
describes them as pursuing a life of animal-like
gratification, dominated by physical pleasures,
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such as eating and the pleasures of touch.9 Terence
Irwin captures this aspect of the comparison
between slavish individuals and slaves in a concise
comment:
The slavish ... person is the one who cares
about nothing beyond the satisfaction of his
nonrational desires; he does not deliberate
about changing them, but simply plans for
their satisfaction. That is all a slave can do,
and all a slavish person wants to do. 10
Individuals may be slavish in this respect for
different reasons having to do with either (l) a lack
of control over their external situation or (2) a
failure of rational control over some obstructive
internal states. Individuals who, like slaves, spend
their lives in wearisome menial labors simply to
supply their fundamental needs fall into the first
category. Lacking external resources, they are
compelled to devote all their energies to meeting
bodily needs. Individuals in the second category
are described as being the slaves of their appetites
and passions. I I When such enslavement is
extreme, one's capacity for rational judgment or for
acting on the basis of such judgment may be
severely diminished. But individuals with strong
acquisitive desires for external goods needed to
satisfy their passions and appetites also fall in this
category even if they are adept in exercising their
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reason in their pursuit of pleasures and their
avoidance of pain. The restricted nature of their
motivation, determined by their passions and
appetites, constrains them from pursuing goods
that are distinctly human.
In contrast, free individuals are seen as capable
of other sorts of motivation and thus as not
controlled by their appetites and passions. Faced
with having to choose between performing some
base act or accepting some painful consequence for
its nonperformance, free persons choose the latter
while unfree individuals choose the former. 12 Part
of the contrast drawn here between unfree and free
individuals is that the former are and the latter are
not such as to perform shameful, disgraceful acts
simply in order to avoid pain or achieve pleasure.
Unlike slavish individuals, free persons are
characterized as being motivated by desires to avoid
acting in ways which are grounds for shame as
well as by desires to engage in activities which
constitutute human excellence.
The second way in which the Greek conception
of slaves is incorporated into the distinction
between free and slavish/unfree individuals is that
just as slaves lead lives controlled by others and
serve their owners' interests rather than their own,
so, too, with unfree or slavish persons. The latter
are seen as under others' control if they are overly
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dependent on being liked or approved of by others
or on various goods that are within others' power
to bestow. Such a dependence may be due to the
slavish person's being dominated by nonrational
desires or by acquisitive desires for external goods,
including not just material things but the honors
that others can give or withhold. Odysseus'
characteristic reasoning in Sophocles' Philoctetes,
for example, marks him as having an "unfree
mind" insofar as he advocates using lies and deceit,
which are grounds for shame, in order to achieve
successes that will enhance one's reputation. 13 In
their excessive need for what is not within their
control, including others' approval, slavish persons
can render themselves instruments of others'
desires. Here again, individuals may be slavish for
different reasons. External factors, such as poverty
and lack of property, mark one as slavish if the
result is that the way in which one spends one's
time and effort, and, therefore, spends much of
one's life, is determined by others. But even
affluent individuals are seen as unfree or slavish
when they are over-dependent on others' approval
or on external goods (e.g., political offices and
other honors) within others' power to withhold or
bestow. One mark of such overdependence is
one's willingness to let what others desire one to
say or do determine one's actions, especially when
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this involves doing something base. This aspect of
the slavish person's character is epitomized in
Greek condemnations of individuals whom they
characterize as flatterers. It is useful to look in
some detail at the Greek conceptions of flatterers
since this character-type exemplifies the relation
between lying, slavishness, and a lack of self-
respect.
Theophrastus offers the following statement:
"Flattery may be understood as a sort of converse
that is shameful, but at the same time profitable to
the one who flatters.I4 Thus, those who flatter are
not simply persons who tell others lies that might
please them but individuals whose lying is a part of
their attempt to make themselves agreeable to others
for personal gain. Obsequious individuals who tell
flattering lies simply in order to be liked and
considered pleasant are also seen as base, but the
term "flatterer" is usually used to characterize
individuals who have ulterior motives for telling
flattering lies. In Plato's Gor~ias, Socrates
describes flattery as base, deceptive, and slavish
and the flatterer's verbal and other behavior as
being in accordance with the values and beliefs of
the object of his flattery rather than his own.IS
Plutarch, too, stresses the flatterer's eschewal of
self-determination:
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The flatterer, since he has no abiding-place of
character to dwell in, and since he leads a life
not of his own choosing but another's
molding and adapting himself to suit another,
is not simple, not one, but variable and many
in one ... and changes his shape to fit his
receiver. 16
Aristotle's portrayal of the flatterer fits this
general picture. He describes a flatterer as some-
one who tells others lies that please them for the
sake of personal gain, who pretends to be their
inferior and to love them more than they love him,
and who attributes "more than is proper and true"
to the objects of flattery .17
Aristotle's contrast between the flatterer and the
magnanimous, truth-loving individual who epito-
mizes human excellence is especially illuminating
regarding the relation between slavishness and
lying:
He [the magnanimous person] must be open
in his hates and loves (for concealment is
proper to fear) and he must care more for
truth than for people's opinions and must be
open in his speech and actions.... And he
must be unable to let anyone, except a friend,
determine how he lives his life; for to do so is
slavish; and hence flatterers are always ser-
vile and base people are flatterers. IS
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This description contrasts the truthful, magna-
nimous person's control over his life and actions
with the slavishness of those who conceal the truth
or lie out of fear, out of a need or a desire for
others' approval, or, given the usual understanding
of the flatterer, for personal gain. In contrast to
slavish persons, free individuals can be seen as
being neither under the control of nonrational and
acquisitive desires nor under others' control.
Rather, they are sufficiently independent of goods
that others can give or withhold so as to be free of
any motivation to lie or perform other base acts in
order to obtain those goods. Nor, as noted earlier,
are free individuals so fearful of some harm that
others have in their power to inflict that they are
willing to do some wrong at another's command.
II. Diminished Autonomy and Lies
Although Greeks do not ordinarily apply the
word "autonomous" ("living by one's own laws")
to persons but to city-states, the Greek distinction
between free and slavish/unfree character-types can
be cast in terms of a contrast between autonomous
individuals, on the one hand, and nonautonomous
individuals or those with diminished automony, on
the other.19 Several conceptions of autonomy are
relevant to such a characterization.20
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(S 1) Autonomy as self-direction or self-
determination. Persons are autonomous in this
sense if they and not others determine what actions
they will perform, or how they will lead their lives
in general. Control by others can take various
forms. It can be coercive (as in the case of slaves
and concentration camp inmates) or benevolent (as
in the case of young children). Coercion can
involve either the direct use of force or the threat of
harm backed up by enforcement power. Slaves, of
course, are paradigm examples of individuals
whose lives are lived under others' control and,
therefore, of individuals whose S1 autonomy is
severely limited.
Initially, the Greek distinction between slavish
and free persons does not seem to involve a
distinction between those lacking and those having
S1 autonomy. Therefore, diminished S1 autonomy
does not seem to be the relevant factor when those
who lie are seen as slavish or unfree. The
flatterer's and obsequious person's lies, for
example, are intended as a means to their goals and
neither the choice of means nor the goals are forced
on them by others by some threat of harm backed
up by enforcement power. The same could be said
of individuals whose poverty and pressing needs
lead them to lie in order to secure some necessary
advantage. Yet, as we have seen, Greeks identify
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one aspect of slavishness with being under others'
control and, therefore, slavish lies with a failure of
51 autonomy. The reason may be partly rooted in
the Greeks' awareness of the extent to which one's
lack of external resources severely diminishes
one's power to control what one does with one's
life. If, to take an extreme example, one person
(A) can satisfy basic needs only by doing as B
commands and working sixteen hours a day at
menial, backbreaking tasks, B is seen as
controlling A's life even if A voluntarily agrees to
work for B. A's lack of control over how he lives
his life is a function of both an internal state (need)
and a lack of external goods which are within
others' control. B's control, in turn, need involve
no coercion of A but only control over what is
necessary to alleviate A's internal state. If A's need
is desperate enough and only B can alleviate it, it is
B who determines just what A's life-long activities
will be if A is to have a life at all. A, unlike a
slave, subjects his life to another's control
voluntarily so, to that extent, A, unlike a slave is
self-determining; but A's 51 autonomy is severely
diminished nonetheless. Here A's compromised
51 autonomy is due to both the paucity of A's
choices and the power that B has to take advantage
of A's "coercive" situation.
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Some slavish lies involve analogous situations.
Greek writings contain numerous examples of
cases where not to lie is to run the risk of death or
some other severe harm. In the most common
example, the one being addressed has the power to
inflict serious harm, or even death, if displeased
with the information conveyed by the speaker. If
under these circumstances, C tells D what C
believes will please D rather than the truth, Greeks
would see C's behavior as slave-like -- as showing
D's control over C. Antisthenes' statement,
"Whoever fears others is himself a slave, "21
reflects this way of thinking. Here again, an
internal state (fear) coupled with C's lack of control
over the resources necessary to limit D's control
over her are seen as diminishing C's autonomy to
determine her actions. There is, of course, a signi-
ficant difference between the cases of A and C. A
acts in accordance with B's expressed orders. In
contrast, if D orders C to provide relevant
information and C gives a lying response out of
fear, C is apparently exercising her S1 autonomy
by not doing as D commands. The Greek percep-
tion of C's lie as evidencing her limited S1 auto-
nomy may be related to the idea, expressed in
various Greek comments, of the relation between
being free in one's speech and not being under
another's contro1.22 Free speech is repeatedly
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linked not just with political freedom but with being
in control of one's external situation in contrast
with being under another's control. To the extent
that one says not what one would prefer to say
(e.g., the truth) but only what one is able to say
without risking grave repercussions, one is seen as
unfree. Greeks, as we have seen, extend this way
of thinking to very different sorts of cases.
Statements made by a politician are seen as
controlled by his hearers rather than himself insofar
as he tells his audience the lies they prefer rather
than the truth in order to get their approval.
If diminished S1 autonomy is conceived this
broadly, many of the lies that Greeks identify with
slavishness and unfreedom involve diminished S1
autonomy -- a forfeiture of control over one's life
and actions -- and are, thereby, grounds for shame
and incompatible with self-respect. Many of the
lies involving diminished S1 autonomy would be
shameful even if they did not evidence a failure of
autonomy (e.g., lies which harm friends or violate
trust); but even lies which may not be shameful in
themselves (e.g., lies which give pleasure, harm no
one, etc.), are incompatible with self-respect if they
are related to a failure of Sl autonomy.
(S2) Autonomy as internal self-2"overnment.
Persons are autonomous in this sense if they are
capable of making and acting on rational decisions
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unobstructed by appetites, passions, or other
internal states that interfere with rational decisions
and actions. The virtue of self-control is often
taken to characterize free individuals while lack of
control is identified with being enslaved, slavish-
ness, and a lack of "mastery."23 It is 52 autonomy
that is at issue when slavish persons' lives are
dominated by their appetites or passions to the
extent that these internal states preclude their acting
in accordance with reason. Lies stemming from
excessive fear, for example, might involve a failure
of 52 autonomy along with lies told by lovers
under the sway of passion or lies told by foolish
individuals who do not understand the potential bad
consequences of lying. However, not all lies told
out of fear of serious repercussions need indicate a
failure of 52 autonomy even if they involve dimi-
nished 51 autonomy. Lying to a powerful tyrant,
may, under some circumstances, be the most
rational thing to do, for example.
(53) Autonomy as a disposition to act on
distinctly human values rather than merely for the
sake of achievin~ pleasure or avoidin~ pain. 53
autonomy might be characterized as follows using a
short version of one of Thomas E. Hill, Jro's
senses of autonomy: "Persons have autonomy in
this sense ... only if they value and are disposed to
bring about some states of affairs without expecting
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that these states of affairs will bring them pleasure
... or prevent pain ... , or at least they do not value
these states of affairs for the sake of the pleasure
(avoidance of pain ... ) which they expect will
result. "24 As we have seen, S3 autonomy is an
important component in Greek characterizations of
free individuals. It is conceivable, for example,
that an intelligent, rational, controlled, and affluent
hedonist, devoted to a life of maximizing physical
pleasures, might be characterized as having both S1
and S2 autonomy. But such an individual would
still be described as unfree if he is not disposed to
pursue more distinctly human values. In the
Gor~ias, for example, Callicles may disagree with
Socrates about the best life for humans to pursue
and, therefore, about the noble and fine things that
ought to be pursued; but he nevertheless considers
those who never see themselves as worthy of fine
and noble things as unfree, in contrast to those who
pursue goals fit for free persons.25
Many of the lies that involve a failure of S 1
autonomy may also involve a failure of S3
autonomy. Lies told under duress may indicate a
character governed by desires to avoid pain at the
cost of human goods such as self-respect.
Flattering lies told in the interest of acquiring
material goods to satisfy desire for pleasure may
show that one is disposed to pursue pleasure at the
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expense of human goods such as honor and
reputation. However, not all lies involving a
failure of S1 autonomy need involve a failure of S3
autonomy. Some lies told under orders may be
compatible with S3 autonomy, for example. One
such case may be found in Sophocles' Philoctetes
when Odysseus urges Neoptolemus to follow his
orders and lie to Philoctetes in order to complete a
mission whose success is necessary if the Greeks
are to defeat the Trojans. The result for
Neoptolemus, Odysseus argues, will be a
reputation for wisdom and courage. Whatever the
speciousness of Odysseus' reasoning, if part of
Neoptolemus' motivation in initially following
these orders is the enhancement of his reputation
among his fellow soldiers, his motives are not
reducible simply to desires to avoid pain or achieve
pleasure. At the same time, Odysseus makes it
clear that he is asking Neoptolemus to temporarily
forfeit his S 1 autonomy and to follow Odysseus'
orders regarding the means to be used to achieve
the requisite success. "Give me yourself for this
short period of time," Odysseus urges, as he tries
to convince Neoptolemus to act in accordance with
Odysseus' values rather than his own since
Neoptolemus himself considers lying to be ethically
unacceptable and incompatible with self-respect.26
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(S4) Autonomy as an ideal human life. Each of
the first three conceptions of autonomy captures
some aspect of the Greek distinction between free
and unfree/slavish individuals. But a fourth, more
encompassing conception of autonomy is necessary
for two reasons. First, someone might have a high
degree of autonomy in one of these senses and yet
lack one of the other forms. As Euripides' charac-
ters sometimes stress, one's legal status may be
that of a slave, so that one's S 1 autonomy is
severely compromised, and yet one may have S2
autonomy if one's passions and appetites are under
sufficient control so that one is willing to perform
some sacrifIcial act out of concern for one's master
or mistress. Thus a conception of autonomy
inclusive of S1-S3 is necessary. Second, a person
might have the other forms of autonomy and yet
lack any significant opportunities to exercise that
autonomy in pursuing those activities that constitute
human excellence. Just what constitutes human
excellence is, of course, subject to debate. Aris-
totle's approach is to think of human excellence in
terms of self-realization and the activities involved
in developing and using one's distinctly human
capacities. To have S4 autonomy (Le., to lead an
ideal human life) a person must have S 1-S3
autonomy and must exercise that autonomy in
living a life of human excellence. S4 autonomy
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best captures the broad sense of the positive pole of
the free-unfree/slavish contrast used in
characterizing the disposition, attitudes, and
behavior of individuals deserving the highest
respect.27 Given the broad sense of S4, any lie
incompatible with the behavior of an individual
living a life of human excellence involves a failure
of autonomy and self-respect. The S I-S3 concep-
tions of autonomy, on the other hand,. are useful in
identifying the nature of the specific failure of
autonomy at issue when some lie is told that marks
one as unfree.
ITI. Greek Ethics
and Contemporary Moral Philosophy
The preceding discussion illustrates some of the
obvious differences between Greek ethical
concerns and those found in contemporary moral
philosophy. First, in contemporary discussions of
the morality of lying, autonomy is usually
considered a right -- a right of self-determination --
and a major concern is with the justifiability of
benevolent lies that might involve usurpations of
another's autonomy. What I have labeled S2 auto-
nomy is brought into these contemporary discus-
sions when they focus on the justifiability of lying
to those whose S2 autonomy is diminished or
severely compromised.28 Second, in contem-
porary discussions, considerations of the grounds
for respect and self-respect are usually entwined
with claims about moral rights and moral status
rather than with considerations of individual merit
or desert. In contrast, in Greek ethical thinking,
with its emphasis on what constitutes the best
human life, whether one is worthy of respect
depends on the life one leads and the character one
exhibits in one's behavior. As we have seen,
factors which are to a large extent a matter of
chance (e.g., one's relative wealth or poverty and
one's having the wherewithal to control others) are
relevant in determining the extent of one's S1 qnd
S4 autonomy and worth. Thus it is not surprising
that in the Greek ethical context, some uses of lies
that are seen as relatively nonproblematic in
contemporary moral discussions might be seen as
ethically problematic. These include (1) the use of
lies (and other fonns of deceit) in lieu of the use of
force against those with greater power 29 and (2)
the use of white lies intended to make oneself
pleasant to others. 30
In the first case, deceit is seen as a weapon
resorted to by those who are typically under others'
control (e.g., women and slaves) and, therefore,
lack the S1 autonomy without which one lacks the
grounds for self-respect. To be more powerful
than your adversary is to be the one in control
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while the use of lies indicates one's awareness of
the other's greater power and control over the
situation. Although it might be argued that the
successful use of lies or trickery is itself an
indication of one's ability to control the situation,
the need to resort to deceit is an indication of one's
comparative weakness in relation to one's
adversary. But more important, perhaps, is the
tension between a wi1ligness to resort to lies against
an enemy and one's having the type of character
associated with 54 autonomy. Although lies are
ordinarily harmful to the one deceived, Greek
ethics incorporates the principle that one ought to
harm one's enemies. Thus it would initially seem
that the use of force and the use of lies against
one's adversaries would be equally acceptable.
However, various comments in Greek writings
stress the importance of developing a coherent set
of attitudes in regard to the use of lies and other
forms of deceit. A later thinker, Plutarch, explicitly
draws out the relation between deceiving one's
enemies and developing wrongful habits:
Knavery, deceit, and intrigue, which do not
seem bad when they are employed against an
enemy, if once they find a lodgment, acquire
a permanent tenure and are hard to eject. The
next thing is that men of themselves employ
these against their friends through force of
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habit, unless they are on their guard against
using them against their enemies.... It would
be a wonderful achievement in disagreements
and contentions with human beings for a man
to be a noble, honest and ingenuous enemy
... so that in dealing with his friends he may
always be steadfast and may keep himself
from wrongdoing.31
Other Greek writings frequently emphasize that
lying in one context casts doubt on the truthfulness
of one's character in genera1.32 This last point is
also relevant in regard to the second use of lies
noted above -- white lies told to make oneself
pleasant to others -- along with trivial boastful lies
told with no ulterior motive. These latter sorts of
lies can also be seen as incompatible with S 1
autonomy since they indicate one's overdependence
on others' approval. Furthermore, they can also
indicate a failure of S2 autonomy. Since the trivial
lies of both boasters and obsequious individuals
may lead others to perceive them as having
untruthful, untrustworthy characters, with all the
possible bad consequences that entails, these lies
would see to be examples of foolish rather than
rational behavior.
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having the motivation attributed to slaves is a
contingent one. See footnote 4 regarding slaves
with different sorts of motivation.
6. See, for example, Aristotle, Nicomachean
Ethics 1095b19 and 1177a8 as well as Kenneth J.
Dover, Greek Popular Morality (Oxford, Basil
Blackwell, 1974),284.
7. On slavery being grounds for shame, see, for
example, Demosthenes, "Against Timocrates,"
123-24.
8. One expression of this view is found in
Demophon's speech in Euripides' The Children of
Hercules, 236-52.
9. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1095b19,
1118a25, 1118b20,1179blO.
10. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, trans. by
Terence Irwin (Hackett Publishing Co., 1985),
410.
I1.Xenophon, Oeconomicus, 1:17-23 and Iso-
crates, "To Demonicus, 21.
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12.See, for example, Demosthenes, "On the
Chersonese," 50-51 and Euripedes, Iphi~eneia at
Aulis,919-34.
13. Sophocles, Philoctetes, 1006.
14. Theophrastus, Characters, 2.1.
15. Plato, Gor~ias, 463a-c, 465b, and 511b-
13c. See also Terence Irwin's comments on 463a-
c in Plato, Gor~ias, translated with Notes by
Terence Irwin (Clarendon Press, 1979), 131-32.
16. Plutarch, "How to Tell a Flatterer from a
Friend," 52A-B, 7-8.
17. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1127a6-12
and 1159a14-17. Aristotle does not explicitly state
that flatterers lie but to attribute "more than is
proper and true" to the object of flattery is to make
false statements.
18. Ibid., 1124b26-1125a2.
19. An exception is found 10 Sophocles'
Anti~one, 821 where the chorus describes
Antigone as autonomous.
20. Hill (cited in footnote 1) discusses various
senses of "autonomy." I draw on his characteri-
zations in formulating some of the following con-
ceptions, especially in my conceptions of S3 and
S4 autonomy.
21. Fernanda Dec1eva Caizzi, Antisthenis
Fra~menta (Milano: Istituto Editoriale Cisalpino,
1969), Fragment 119.
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22. See, for example, Euripides, Andromache,
153.
23. See, for example, Xonophon,
Oeconomicus, 1:17-23.
24. Hill (cited in footnote 1),256-260.
25. Plato, Gor~as, 485c-e.
26. Sophocles, Philoctetes, 55-120.
27. In his notes on Aristotle's Nicomachean
Ethics (footnote 10), Irwin comments, "Aristotle
says less about the broader type of eleutherios
because it is really virtue as a whole (i.e., the
appropriate non-slavish attitude to happiness)
viewed in a particular way (here it is similar to
general justice, 1130a1O)," 405. Irwin's comment
reflects the broad construal of what it is to be a free
person, construed in terms of S4 autonomy.
28. Hill (footnote 1) discusses variants of both
S3 and S4 autonomy in his discussion of
benevolent lies. Some benevolent lies are seen as
morally problematic when they involve treating a
person not as someone who holds a distinctly
human value -- truth -- as an important value but as
someone who values the avoidance of pain more
(thus treating the person as lacking S3 autonomy).
Others are seen as morally problematic if they
involve depriving a person of the realistic picture of
a situation necessary to leading a life of human
excellence -- one in which one has rational control
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over one's situation -- and thus compromising S4
autonomy.
29. Christina M. Korsgaard expresses the usual
contemporary view that if one has to choose
between lying and the use of force, lying is the
better option. But she also notes that at least two
thinkers -- Kant and Carilinal John Henry Newman
-- disagreed with this view, seeing lying as the
worse option. Christina M. Korsgaard, "The Right
to Lie: Kant on Dealing with Evil," Philosophy
and Public Affairs 15:4 (Fall 1986), footnote 12,
325-49.
30. On white lies see Sissela Bok, Lyin~:
Moral Choice in Public and Private Life (New
York: Pantheon Books, 1978), 57-72 and Joseph
Kupfer, "The Moral Presumption Against Lying,"
Review of Metaphysics 36 (1982-1983), 103-26.
Bok construes white lies very broadly so that they
include the use of placebos and untruthful letters of
recommendation. She is, however, critical of most
uses of even the most trivial white lies although she
does not present a well developed argument against
the more trivial forms of white lies.
31. Plutarch, "How to Profit from One's
Enemies," 91b-d.
32. See, for example, Demosthenes XXIV: 133,
Aristotle, Rhetoric. 1417b36-1418al, and
Thucydides IV:86.
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